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quired for an adit to be run, in, upon or along a lode is ten feet,
without regard to depth". The Court rejected the argument ad-
vanced by the defendant that in order to make a valid discovery,
plaintiffs must have cut, by their work in such discovery, ten feet
below the surface.
In none of the three cases in which the Court discussed the
sufficiency of an adit to hold the lode, was the question of uncover-
ing a vein of mineral raised, that is to say, in each case, the adit
did follow and uncover a vein of mineral. Just as it is necessary
for a discovery shaft to show a well defined crevice, it is necessary
for an adit to follow in along the lode. An adit which did not follow
the lode would be no more effective in holding the claim than would
be a ten foot shaft which did not disclose a crevice.
A mine is described as a pit or excavation from which ores,
etc., are taken by digging. A scoop-out along the lode which un-
covers ore would therefore be classified both as a mine and the
entrance to the mine from which ores are removed, or an adit.
We therefore believe the Colorado Supreme Court, following its
former decisions, would hold that a scoop-out which uncovered
fissionable ores for a horizontal distance of at least ten feet would
constitute an adit and therefore be legally sufficient under the
statute to hold the lode.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE, AGENCY,
FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE.-Moore v. Skiles, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv.
Sheet No. 1.
The facts of the case are these: the plaintiff and her husband
were riding in a pick-up truck owned jointly by them both; the
husband was driving and the wife was occupying the seat next to
him. During the course of the trip, a collision with a vehicle driven
by the defendant occurred. The wife brought suit to recover dam-
ages to herself and the truck predicated on the negligence of the
defendant.
After trial was had, the jury returned a verdict complying
with instruction No. 4, in which it found for the defendant. In-
struction No. 4 was, in substance, that if the jury found that the
accident was caused by the negligence of both drivers, then the
plaintiff, (who was neither of the drivers) could not recover. The
plaintiff assigned error to the fact that the trial court allowed the
negligence of the driver-husband to be imputed to the passenger-
wife. The Supreme Court stated the problem thusly:
When a husband and wife are journeying together in
a vehicle jointly owned by both and engaged in a mission
with a purpose common to both, can the negligence of the
husband in operating the vehicle be imputed to the wife?
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This question was answered in the affirmative. In arriving
at its conclusion, the Court mentioned several theories, any of
which in itself would have been sufficient.
The rules of imputed negligence are, rhetorically speaking,
the rules of vicarious liability working in reverse: where a person
against whom a claim for relief is asserted is not himself personally
negligent, yet he may be held liable because of his relationship
with the one who was the negligent party; so too may one who
asserts a claim based on negligence be subject to the defense of
contributory negligence because of his relationship with one who
actively participated in the incident. It is the definition of that
relationship that was the primary subject of this decision.
a It is almost universally held that the relationship of driver
and passenger between two persons is not in itself sufficient to
impute negligence from one to the other.1
but there is a well-recognized exception to this rule
when the injured person is in a position to exercise author-
ity or control over the driver, or is guilty, or fails to exer-
cise such care under the particular circumstances to pro-
tect himself.
2
Moreover, the existence of the marital relationship is not adequate
to impute the negligence of the husband to the wife "unless he is
her agent in the matter at hand, or they are jointly engaged in the
prosecution of a common enterprise." 3
It is the substance of the relationship, therefore, that is the
determinant factor, and not the form. As stated above, the con-
nection as husband and wife, or as driver and passenger, or even
as a combination of the two is not that substance out of which im-
puted negligence arises. The association between persons substan-
tial enough to carry the imputation is that of agency, express or
implied, and the quality of the association is tested by the right to
control of one over the other.
In this case the Court found, or at least inferred, that the right
to control may have arisen between the plaintiff in any one of
several ways. The first to be considered is that of the family car
doctrine.
This doctrine was first noted in Colorado in the case of Hutch-
ins v. Haffner,4 where the Court said:
... a husband is liable for the injury inflicted by his auto-
mobile which he purchased for family use, while it was
I Dale v. Denver Tramway Co., 173 F. 787, 97 CCA 511, 19 Ann. Cas. 1223,
8 LRA (NS) 597; Atchison, T. & S. RR. v. McNulty, 285 F. 97; Colo. Springs Co.
v. Cohun, 66 Colo. 149, 180 P. 307.
2 C. & S. RR. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 405, 81 P. 801, 70 LRA 681.
* Phillips f Denver Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, Ann, Cas. 1914B,
29.
, 63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966.
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being operated by his wife, solely for her own pleasure
under his general permission to use the machine whenever
and wherever she pleased, upon the theory that the wife
was the husband's agent in carrying out one of the pur-
poses for which the car was purchased and owned.
This principle is then an expression of the general law of
agency, though it may be implied, based on the right to control and
acts committed within the scope of authority. But the difficulty
in this instance is apparent not only in that the negligence is to
be imputed between co-owners, but also because it is to be imputed
to the wife, who is not the "head of the family". A study of the
record in this case would disclose that there is no evidence to the
effect that the husband-driver had any general permission in the
use of the car; no evidence that the "husband in this case had gen-
eral authority to drive the car whenever and wherever he pleased",
as the Court stated. It is the opinion of this writer that the Court
would not have imputed the negligence in this case on the grounds
of "family car" if that were the only possibility, because of the
lack of evidence of the general permission.
Another theory used by the court was the presumption that an
owner-occupant of a car has the right of control over the driver.
The presumption that attends the situation in which the owner
of a car is a non-driving occupant has never before appeared in
the Colorado reports. This Court cited, with apparent approval,
the case of Fox v. Lacvender,5 but did not expressly say that the
rule of the Fox case was controlling. The rule is this:
... where an owner is an occupant of his own car there
arises a rebuttable presumption that has control and
direction of it . . . Where a sole owner is driving it is
presumed, without more, that he is in control and has the
complete right of control; when the sole owner is present
in the car and another is driving, it is presumed without
more being shown, that the sole owner has the right of
control, and that the driver is driving for him, that is,
as his agent. If two or more joint owners are in the car,
they will be presumed to have the joint right of control
and therefore the driver will be presumed to be driving
for himself and as the agent of the other present joint
owners.
This view, though popular in an impressive number of juris-
dictions, is by no means universally accepted, but represents one
side of what is a decided split of authority in this country. 6 It is
this writer's belief that the presumption of control should stand
in a situation such as this because it facilitates the ascertainment
56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 ALR 105.
'158 A. 166, 305 Pa. 479, 80 ALR 280.
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of truth that would not otherwise be discoverable, and is based on
common experience and usual connection.
7
Although the Court indicated approval of imputing negli-
gence in this case through the use of the family car doctrine, or
the presumption of control by an occupant-owner, the decision is
more correctly said to be based on the theory of joint enterprise.
The Court said:
Where, as here, joint ownership of the car is shown;
where joint occupancy and possession of the vehicle is
admitted, and where the occupant-owners of the car use
it upon a joint mission, the driver will be presumed to be
driving for himself and as agent for the other present
joint owner.
This statement does not encompass the family relationship or gen-
eral permission of the family car doctrine. Neither does it adopt
the presumption of control by an owner-occupant, for it adds the
requirement that there be a use upon a joint mission or common
purpose.
The basis for decision is joint venture, which finding was
facilitated by a presumption consisting of joint ownership, joint
occupancy and common purpose to show such joint venture.
It should be remembered that the circumstances found in this
decision do not give rise to any new substantive law. The law
deciding this case is the conventional doctrine of the master's re-
sponsibility for his servant. The presumption which was indulged
was only a device to find such a relationship, and this presumptioh
was rebuttable. Subsequent litigants who find themselves in sim-
ilar situations may defend their vicarious liability or disability by
showing non-agency, the true relationship of driver and guest, or
that of bailor and bailee, or any of the other possible defenses to
such allegation. Not all joint owners who travel together carry
with them this contagious negligence, but they must be prepared
at trial to administer the serum of rebutting evidence.
HERB WEISER
'American Insurance Co. v. Naylor, 101 Colo. 34, 70 P. 2d 349; Roberts v.
People, 9 Colo. 458, 13 P. 630.
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